



Digital Identity: It may be secure, but will it protect your privacy?

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Privacy Question:

How do email marketers know
when to call?

One Method: Tracking Beacons

- How: add a 1x1 pixel image HTML-based email
- Can report: IP address, device type, location, accesses, etc.
- Also: anything that loads remote content (e.g., .doc, .pdf, etc.)

```
<body>  
  
  <!-- ... -->  
    
  
</body>
```

Data Brokers


- Leverage beacons and Identifiers
- Collect & correlate personal data
- Growing: \$277B (2024) → \$512B (2033)

"Email addresses enhance identity resolution by enabling the consolidation of data across multiple platforms and channels."


~ AtData

Review: Mobile Driver's License

- Digital Driver's License ... in an app or wallet
- Defined by ISO/IEC 18013-5
- Can it track people?



General mDL Architecture




Device Retrieval

Privacy Respecting

?


Issuer Chooses
mDL holds config



Server Retrieval

Phone Home Configuration

Interoperability: *Assist With International Monitoring?*



Device Retrieval (locally) + Server Retrieval (internationally)

NoPhoneHome.com

“We, the undersigned, believe that identity systems must be built without the technological ability for authorities to track when or where identity is used.

...

Eliminating phone home capabilities is not the only requirement in building a privacy-protective identity system, but it is a vital one.”

Currently over 240 orgs & individuals supporting



Statement

We, the undersigned, believe that identity systems must be built without the technological ability for authorities to track when or where identity is used. Such tracking can occur when either the identity verifier or user's application interacts with or "phones home" to the identity issuer or another third party. Identity systems that phone home facilitate centralized tracking and control, privacy invasions, and other potential abuses. If this capability exists within a digital identity system, even inactively, it will eventually be used.

We are concerned that many authorities are unnecessarily (and sometimes unknowingly) adopting identity systems with phone home capabilities. We call on authorities everywhere to favor identity solutions that have no phone home capability whatsoever, and to prioritize privacy and security over interoperability and ease of implementation.

Eliminating phone home capabilities is not the only requirement in building a privacy-protective identity system, but it is a vital one.

Signers

Organizations

[American Civil Liberties Union \(ACLU\)](#)
[Brave Software](#)
[Cardano Foundation](#)
[Center for Democracy and Technology \(CDT\)](#)
[cheqd Foundation](#)
[Decentralized Identity Foundation \(DIF\)](#)
[Decentralized AI Society \(DAIS\)](#)
[Digital Credentials Consortium \(DCC\)](#)
[Dyne.org](#)
[Electronic Frontier Foundation \(EFF\)](#)
[Electronic Privacy Information Center \(EPIC\)](#)
[Emergent Research](#)
[epicenter works](#)
[FIDES Community](#)
[Hovi](#)
[Hushmesh Inc.](#)
[iComply](#)
[iLabs Technologies](#)
[INATBA](#)
[Internet Safety Labs](#)
[JLINC Labs](#)
[Julia Social](#)
[KERI Foundation](#)
[Larissa Health](#)
[Libertas Institute](#)
[Mavennet Systems Inc.](#)
[New America's Open Technology Institute](#)

mDL Community Responded Quickly

1. American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA)

“The main update in version 1.5 is that the server retrieval method is now prohibited for issuing authorities that want to join the AAMVA Digital Trust Service.”

(Note: this May 2025 update applies to all US-based driver’s licenses.)

2. Proposed revision to ISO/IEC 18013-5 (draft: 25 July 2025)

- Removes Server Retrieval altogether

State of Utah:

A Privacy-Focused Identity

State of Utah: Digital Identity

2025: State Endorsed Digital Identity (SEDI)
Defined in Utah Code § 63A-16-12



Effective 5/7/2025

63A-16-1202. State digital identity policy.

(1) It is the policy of Utah that:

- (a) each individual has a unique identity;
- (b) the state does not establish an individual's identity;
- (c) the state may, in certain circumstances, recognize and endorse an individual's identity;
- (d) the state is obligated to respect an individual's privacy interest associated with the individual's identity;
- (e) the state is the only governmental entity that may endorse an individual's digital identity for the purpose of establishing a state-endorsed digital identity;

State of Utah



2025: State Endorsed Digital Identity (SEDI)

- RFI AE26-1 (9/2 - 10/6)
- Core Principles
 1. **Individual Control** – selective disclosure, data / verifier limitations
 2. **Security and Privacy** – must prioritize security & privacy
 3. **State's Role** – state endorses identity, but does not create it
 4. **Guardianship** – delegation to guardians for minors, disabled, etc.
 5. **Technological compliance** – via technology vs administrative policies
 6. **Revocation limits** – very limited circumstances

Will digital identity increase
privacy ... *or tracking?*

Thank You!

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